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Appellant, Larry Jiron, appeals
from his conviction on the charge of
Second Degree Burglary.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried and convicted
by a jury of the crime of Second Degree
Burglary.

The Honorable Henry Ruggeri

of the Seventh Judicial District Court
presided.

From a verdict of Guilty,

Appellant appeals.

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have the conviction reversed and the case remanded for
a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the early morning of November
18, 1969, Duncan Electric, 290 South
Main Street, Bountiful, Utah, was
allegedly burglarized (T 6-10).

The

merchandise taken consisted mainly of
several television sets.

On November

19, 1969, Salt Lake City and Bountiful
policemen recovered several television
sets, matching the description and
serial numbers of the stolen sets, from
the home of Roy Jiron, the brother of
the Defendant-Appellant (T 81).

Sub-

sequently the Appellant, Larry Jiron,
was notified that he was being sought
by the Bountiful City Police, at which
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time he surrendered himself to them.
Thereupon he was charged with the crime
of Second Degree Burglary (T 134).

The

trial for that charge was held January
14, 1970 at Davis County.
The chief witness for the State was
Frederick Leslie Palmer, an alleged
accomplice in the burglary.

He had

been granted inununity from prosecution
by the State in return for his testimony
in the case (T 30).

The testimony was

extremely damaging to the DefendantAppellant in that it tended to implicate
the Appellant in the planning and perpetration of the crime.
In order to impune the credibility
of Palmer, counsel for Appellant attempted
to introduce evidence relating to the
witness' use of drugs generally and
his use of drugs on or about the time
of the alleged burglary particularly.
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The State's objection to admission of
this evidence was sustained (T 65).
The Court also refused to allow the
testimony of another accused accomplice,
Defense witness Michael Townsend.
Appellant attempted to elicit evidence
concerning Palmer's condi ti.on on the
night of the burglary, i.e., whether
or not he was under the influence of
drugs.

(T 105).

Townsend further

testified that Appellant had not been
involved in the burglary.
The Appellant attempted once again
to attack the credibility of the State's
principal witness by cross examining
him regarding his discharge from the
United States Navy based upon emotional
and mental problems.

Once again this

questioning was objected to and sustained
by the Court (T 66).
At the trial, the only corroborating
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witness for Palmer's damaging testimony
was Christina Jiron, wife of Roy Jiron
and sister-in-law of the Appellant.

It

was from her home that the television
sets had been recovered.

On direct exam-

ination she testified that she had
rec-ei ved a telephone call from a man
whom she thought was probably the
Appellant on the day following the alleged
burglary.

The caller acknowledged the

presence of the television sets and
promised to remove them (T 21-23).

On

cross-examination her testimony revealed
that the caller had not identified
himself, and she admitted that she was
not certain that the Appellant was the
caller.

In addition, Mrs. Jiron testi-

fied that she had not talked to the
Appellant on the telephone for three
or four months prior to that time, and
admitted that the caller could have been

6

any one of Appellant's many brothers,
each having similar voice qualities and
accents (T 25-27).
At the end of the State's case
Appellant moved for a directed verdict
on the basis of lack of sufficient corrohora ting evidence of the alleged
accomplice's testimony.
denied (t 92).

The motion was

At the end of the trial

the jury found the Appellant guilty as
charged on the information and he was
sentenced to the Utah State Prison for
the statutory term.

7

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
GRANTING A DIRECTED VERDICT IN FAVOR
OF APPELLANT AS THE STATE FAILED TO
PRODUCE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CORROBORATE
THE TESTIMONY OF AN ALLEGED ACCOMPLICE.
Section 77-31-18 Utah Code Annotated
(1953) provides "A conviction shall not
be had on the testimony of an accomplice,
unless he is corroborated by other evi•
dence, which in itself and without aid
of the testimony of the accomplice tends
to connect the Defendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration shall not be sufficient, if it
merely shows the conunission of the
offense or the circumstances thereof."
In State v. Erwin 101 U. 365, 120 P.
2d 285 (1941) the Court explained the
test for sufficiency or corroborating

8

evidence.

" .•• The corroborating evidence

must implicate the defendant in the
offense and be consistent with his guilt
and inconsistent with his innocence, and·
must do more than cast a grave suspicion
on him, and all of this must be without
the aid of the testimony of the accomplice (Emphasis added)".

Id at 393.

The evidence in our case clearly does
not meet the test.
Standing alone, the corroborating
evidence in our case does not "implicate" the Defendant in the burglary.
It does not "do more than cast a grave
suspicion" on the accused.

The State's

entire case must rise or fall upon the
testimony of Christina Jiron and specifically upon the telephone call that
she received. (T 22).

If the Court

ignores the witnesses uncertainty
regarding the identity of the caller and

9

considers her testimony in a light most
favorable to the prosecution that testimony, at best, would tend to connect the
Appellant with the crime of possession
of stolen property but not with the crime
of burglary.

Had he been arrested for

having possession of stolen goods he
would have a chance to explain that
possession.

But that was not the crime'

charged on the information and was not
the crime to be proved.

It is important

to note that no one ever saw Appellant
with the television sets and no one
testified to ever having seen the
Defendant either immediately before or
after the burglary with either of the
admitted participants.
Mrs. Jiron's testimony does not
sufficiently tie the Appellant to the
crime to sustain the State's burden.
She testified:
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Q.

And, did you recognize the voice on
the phone?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Tell us whose voice it was.

A.

Larry's.

Q.

Are you referring to Larry Jiron?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Who is seated here with counsel; is
that correct?

A.

Yes (T 22) •

Q.

Tell us what, if anything, was said

...

by Larry as he called you.
A.

He just asked for Roy.

Q.

And what did you tell him?

A.

He wasn't home.

Q.

And then what, if anything, was said.

A.

He just said that he brought some
T.V.s down and he was getting them
out that night (T 23).
After this the Appellant, on cross-
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examination of Mrs. Jiron, asked if she
was really certain that it was Larry
Jiron on the telephone.
"No".

Q.

(T 25)

She answered

And testified on re-cross:

Mrs. Jiron, could it have been someone
else in your mind?

A.

Yes.

It could have been one of his

brothers.

I don't know.

Q.

How many brothers are there?

A.

Four, I think.

Q.

Similar quality to their voices?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Similar type accent?

A.

Yes (T 2() ,27)

And later it was established that Mrs.
Jiron had not talked to Larry on the
telephone for three or four months prior
to the telephone call about which she
was testifying (T 67).
Clearly then, the State's only
corroborating witness {T 94) did not
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sufficiently implicate the Appellant
with the crime charged.

She admitted

it could have been one of four other
brothers.

This is important especially

since the accomplice also tried to
implicate two of the brothers she mentioned, John (T 33), and Richard (T 42).
Also she said it could have been "Junior
or Dave".

(T

27)

Considering all of

these alternative identifications of the
voice on the telephone, there was not
sufficient corroborating evidence, as
required by statute, that the Appellant
was implicated in the burglary.
This Court, in State v. Clark, 3
U. 2d 382, 284 P. 2d 700 (1955) held
that a corroborating identification was
insufficient to support the accomplices'
testimony.

That case involved a woman

who was the recipient of an illegal
abortion and who was the State witness-
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accomplice.

Her husband was to provide

the corroborating evidence against the
defendant who was the alleged procuress.
The wife became very ill the evening of
the abortion and her husband proceeded
to take her to a hospital.

He was met

on his front porch by a woman who fit
the description of the defendant; she
warned him not to take his wife to the
hospital.

The woman again stopped him

in front of the hospital and warned
him against taking his wife in.

The

husband at trial said that he could
not be absolutely positive about the
lady's identification.

It was held

that the corroborating evidence was
insufficient.

In addition to the

husband's tentative identification,
the phone number of the defendant was
in his wife's purse, he called the
number for his wife the morning of the

14
abortion and the woman,
when arrested ,
.
had abortion inducing drugs in her purse.
The Statute involved in the Clark case
was 77-31-14 Utah Code Annotated (1953)
which has similar corroboration requirements.

In our case there is certainly

less evidence tying Appellant to the
crime than was adduced in the Clark
case where the corroboration was found
to be insufficient.
In State v. Pratt, 25

u.

2d 76, 475

P. 2d 1013 (1970) this Court, in a three
to two decision, found there was a lack
of sufficient corroborating evidence for
the testimony of an alleged accomplice
on a contributing to juvenile delinquency.
charge.

In that case a young girl posed

for lewd pictures.

The girl, the hal.f

sister of the Defendant could not, with
any certainty, implicate the Defendant
in the activities.

She could not defi-
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nitely place him at the scene of the
crime.

While the Defendant admitted

being there temporarily, he presented an
alibi for the bulk of the period involved.
The Court in reversing the lower Court
found vagueness and uncertainty in the
·testimony of the corroborating witnesses.
In our case there is certainly
vagueness and uncertainty in the testimony of Mrs. Jiron.

The fact that there

are several brothers who could have made
the call, coupled

the lack of suf-

ficient conversation on the telephone to·
tie the caller with the burglary should
clearly invalidate the value of the testimony.

Her "testimony is no stronger than

its weakest link on cross-examination"
(State v. Pratt, supra) and the burden
of corroboration is more weight than that
testimony can bear.
It is also important to note that
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both the Court and the prosecutor
commented on Mrs. Jiron's apparent candor,
frankness and honesty.

She also stated

that there was no other reason than the
sound of the voice, for believing the
caller was Appellant and that all Appellant's brothers sounded alike.
There is further reason to look
with extra care at the testimony of the
accomplice.

Just prior to the burglary

the witness and the Appellant had two
disagreements.

(T 66, 67, 135, 136).

They may have been enough to have the
Witness include another name in his
story.

The act of .the Appellant in

refusing to allow Palmer to stay at
Appellant's apartment and the fact
that Palmer felt Appellant was responsible for damage to a rented car makes
it incumbent upon us to assess at the
probable motivation behind his testimony.
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The State has the burden of proving
guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable
doubt.

In this case, where the only evi-

dence directly connecting the Appellant
with the crime is the testimony of an
admitted accomplice, there is an additional
burden of sufficient corroborating evidence.

This burden was not met and the

trial Court should have directed the
verdict as moved by Appellant.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT PERMITTING EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE USE OF
DRUGS BY THE STATE'S CHIEF WITNESS .AND
PARTICULARLY HIS USE OF DRUGS ON OR
ABOUT THE TIME OF THE CRIME.
Mr. Palmer, the State's admitted
accomplice, was questioned concerning
his use of drugs.

The prosecution had

its objections sustained by the Court
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and was able to have this damaging
.evidence excluded (T 65).

The purpose

of Appellant was to show that the witness
was under the influence of drugs on the
night about which he was testifying and
that his memory was therefore impaired.
The State had questioned one of the
Appellant's witnesses, Michael Townsend,
another admitted accomplice, about his
use of drugs on the night in question
(T 104), and argued that he could not
remember the events of that night as a
result.

Appellant asked that witness

if Palmer was also on drugs that night
but State's objection was sustained (T 105).
Appellant contends that such questioning
was probative and that the jury should
have been allowed to consider this evidence as it would have related to the
credibility of the testimony of the
State's chief witness.
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There are no Utah cases directly
in point; however, several other States
have dealt with the problem and generally
hold that evidence of drug use should
be adrnissable.
In State v.Fong Loon, 158 P. 233
(Idaho., 1916) the Defendant was accused
of murder.

The victim was Chinese and

made a dying declaration in Chinese.

The

witness for the State took the dying
declaration and translated it.

An

attempt to impeach his perceptive ability
and credibility was made by the Defense
in introducing evidence of the use of
opium by the witness.
excluded.

The evidence was

The Supreme Court found rever-·

. sible error saying, "But we do mean to
hold that the habitual use of morphine,
cocaine and other like narcotics, which
inevitably tend to impair the mind·, destroy
the memory and moral character of a witness·
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may be shown for the purpose of affecting
his credibility or the weight that should
be given to his testimony."

Id at 237.

In this case it was not asserted that
the witness was using drugs at the time
he took the dying declaration, rather
that he was an habitual user.
Two Texas cases support this rule.
In a murder case the trial court
excluded testimony offered from the
prosecuting witness herself and from
others that she was a morphine addict.
It was not alleged that she was under
the influence at the time of the event
about which she was testifying.

The

Court of Criminal Appeals reversed.
They held the evidence was admissible .for
purposes of testing the credibility of
the witness.

Andersen v. State, 144

S . W• 2 81 ( Tex • , 1912 ) •
In the other case, Beland v. State,

21
217 S.W. 147 (Tex., 1920) the crime
charged was larceny.

The only real

witness for the State was allegedly
a morphine addict.

An attempt was made

by the defense to question both the witness who used drugs and other witness
about his use of drugs.
was excluded.

The evidence

The Court of Criminal

Appeals reversed saying in part, "It
has been held in this State in a number
of cases that it may be shown that a
witness was drunk at the time of the
occurrence about which he seeks to
testify: (citations).

We are of the

opinion that if it can be successfully
established that a material witness is
an habitual user of cocaine, morphine,
or opium, that fact should be admitted
as a circumstance to be considered by
the jury in determining his memory and
mental condition."

Id.
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A Montana case, in spelling out
that drug addiction is not generally
admissible would still allow it in our
case.

In State v. Glein, 41 Pac 998

(Mont., 1895) at 1001 the court said,
"We see no error in refusing to permit
a Witness to be asked on cross-examination, for the purpose of affecting her
credibility, whether or not she is
addicted to the morphine habit (cite),
unless it is proposed to show that the
witness was under the influence of the
drug at the time the events happened about
which she testified, or unless she was
under the influence of morphine at the
time she is testifying, or unless it is
made to appear that her powers of recollection are impaired by the habitual or
excessive use· of the drug."

(Emphasis

added)
And in McCormick, Evidence Section

23
45 (1954) at page 98, "one form of abnormality is that of being under
of drugs or drink.

influence

If the witness was

under such influence at the time of the
happenings which he reports in his testimony or is so at the time he testifies,
this of course is provable, on cross or

by extrinsic evidence, to impeach."
In our case the trial court should
have permitted the evidence as to the
use of the State's witness Palmer's use
of drugs on the night of the burglary.
This would have a great impact on the
jury's acceptance of his powers of perception at that time, perhaps his memory
ability and certainly the credibility
of his testimony.

Where the only real

witness to the crime is high on drugs,
justice demands that .the jury know about
it.

24

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE ADMITTED
EVIDENCE THAT THE STATE'S CHIEF WITNESS
HAD BEEN RECENTLY DISCHARGED FROM THE
UNITED STATES NAVY FOR REASONS OF
EMOTIONAL INSTABILITY AND THAT HE HAD
ATTEMPTED SUICIDE ONLY EIGHT MONTHS
PRIOR TO THE EVENTS ABOUT WHICH HE
WAS TESTIFYING.
The Appellant was prepared to
introduce evidence that the State's
chief witness, Frederick Palmer, was
discharged from the U.S. Navy for
reasons of "a duly diagnosed emotionally
unstable personality".

Also, the Appel-

lant was prepared to show that Palmer
had, only eight months before the
burglary, attempted to take his life
by slashing his wrists.

When Appellant

asked the Witness, on cross-examination,
about the state of his emotional and
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mental health, the prosecution objected
and was sustained (T 66).

The aim of the

questioning was to impeach the credibility
of the testimony.
There have been no Utah cases dealing
with the admissibility of evidence of a
witness's mental health in order to
impeach the credibility of the testimony.
However, several other jurisdictions have
confronted the problems we have here.
In Markowitz v. Milwaukee Electric

Ry. and Light Co., 284 N.W. 31 (Wis.,
1939) the witness, a woman, had received
serious injuries in an accident some
months before.

The defense objected to .

her testifying but she was allowed.

How-

ever, the evidence of her damaged spine
and head and resulting hysteria were
admitted for purposes of attacking her
credibility an'd would go· to the weight
of the evidence.

26

In North Carolina, in the case of
State v. Conrad, 168 S.E. 2d 39 (N.C.,
1969), the problem was the attempted
suicide.

The Defendants in that trial

were accused of conspiracy to commit
murder.

The witness, an ex-girlfriend

of one of the defendants, gave some very
damaging testimony about the conspiracy.
The high court held reversible the fact
that the defense could not question her
as to her attempted suicide two years
before.

The Court said, "In light of

the prejudicial testimony which the
witness had

against both Ballimore

and Davis, her attempt at suicide conceivably might have some relevancy as
to her mental balance and her recollection
sufficient to be impeaching."

Id at p. 44

And in commonwealth v. Towber, 152
A 2d 917 (Pa., 1959) at p. 920 the court
said, "Psychiatric treatment in a hospital

27

within seven months of the date of trial
was near enough to raise a question for
the jury as to the effect of Fitzgerald's
mental disorder on his credibility."

In

that case, as here, the crime was burglary,
and there the witness was an accomplice
who had been granted immunity from prosecution.

The omission of psychiatric care

evidence by the trial court was found to
be reversible error.
In light of the decisions relative
to this issue and the crucial role
played by Palmer in this case, reversible
error should be found.

Whenever one man,

by his sole testimony, can endanger a
person's freedom,

justice demands that

every chance be given to impeach his
credibility.

Where, as in our case,

the witness had within recent months
been discharged from the military for
reasons of emotional instability and
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had only eight months before attempted
suicide, it is vital that the jury have
this information to provide them with the
background necessary for a responsible
analysis of his testimony.
It is ordinarily the rule that the
Court allow wide latitude in the scope
of the cross-examination so that the
net testimony is reduced to its proper
qualitative value.

"The purpose of

cross-examination is to give adversary
counsel the opportunity not only to
inquire into uncertainties relating to
the testimony in chief, but to test its
credibility.

Whatever may tend to

explain, modify or contradict that
direct evidence should be allowed."
Weber Basin Water Conservancy District
Vs. War d ,

lo U• 2d 29, 3 47 P.2d 862 (1959).
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CONCLUSION
It is submitted that on each of the
issues presented herein, both the facts
and the law are in accordance with the
contentions of the Appellant.
For lack of sufficient evidence to
corroborate the testimony of an accomplice, a directed verdict should have
been rendered in favor of the DefendantAppellan t.
By not admitting testimony concerning
the use of drugs by the State's chief
witness, the Court did not permit the
jury to fully weigh the witness's testimony nor allow the Defendant-Appellant
an opportunity to test his credibility.
It is further submitted that the
trial court also erred in not admitting
evidence tending to question the credibility
of the State's primary witness.

30
Justice demands a reversal of the
conviction and that the case be remanded
for a new trial.

